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Much of the discussion here focuses on lawyers and judges in the military criminal justice system, but this leaves out a hugely important group of actors: the police. For example, it seems like a half-hearted measure to tweak factual sufficiency appellate review when the fact-development on the crime scene itself is botched from the start. With this in mind, consider this new article, with whistleblowers, from Army Times: Army CID is burned out and mismanaged by military police leadership, special agents say Brenner FissellEIC
2 Comments
Scott
12/16/2020 06:16:08 pm
The “whistleblower” CID agents make some good points. 12/17/2020 09:50:09 am
The Ft Hood CID example remains preciently a symptom of the greater issue concerning law enforcement reform in America. Military law enforcement operations (primarily criminal investigations) are incredibly nuanced across all services branches. This was even more compounded in recent decades due to joint basing, where one service branch law enforcement chief would command another branch’s local law enforcement operations, often with conflicting authorities, missions, etc. Investigations (even for misdemeanors) can range in intricacies due to the status of the defendant, their victim(s), often giving rise to jurisdictional clashes, logistical limitations with investigative activities, or even plain negligence due to command influence “to close” the case. The subordination of Army CID under a field MP command was always problematic since its inception, but primarily due to the risk of unlawful command influence as opposed to investigative negligence. This tension is likely what led the Air Force to organize its OSI as an independent command under the Inspector General, in addition to other reasons. Even with AF officers as field agents, newly minted or not, some quickly gain leadership roles even when they don’t burn out like the other enlisted agents. The percentage (92%) of enlisted Army CID agents who had not received full investigator accreditation should be a top concern (particularly for area defense counsel who represent anyone investigated by them). The AF Security Forces Office of Investigations’s rules, for example, allow for Defense Force Commanders to appoint investigators without formal training, but usually when the person has substantial experience or skills to perform the work. Even then, they are usually required to attend formal training when reasonably available in the future. Another example from AFOSI and AF Security Forces, they allowed for joint drug and sexual assault investigators to support local base OSI detachments. Problems with continuity and retention, however, continue to complicate these initiatives since combat deployments, budgetary constraints, and other issues influence the lifecycle of training, fielding, and networking needed to obtain proficient criminal investigations. Your comment will be posted after it is approved.
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