Dateline: 16 October 2020 (as of 1000).
Post argument review on SCOTUSBlog.
The sole issue raised by Appellant on appeal is whether the military judge abused his discretion by excluding attachments to Appellant’s unsworn statement. We also consider whether Appellant is entitled to relief due to facially unreasonable appellate delay. We find no prejudicial error and affirm the findings and sentence.
On appeal, Appellant personally identifies one issue pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and “requests that the conviction and sentence be set aside”: whether the convening authority abused her discretion “by denying Appellant’s request to defer adjudged forfeitures of pay for the benefit of his dependents.”3 We also consider a second issue: whether Appellant’s sentence is inappropriately severe in light of Appellant’s statements of fact in a post-trial declaration submitted to this court after the convening authority took action on the sentence. We find no error and affirm the findings and the sentence.
On appeal, Appellant raises two issues. First, he asserts the military judge erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of his urinalysis. Second, he argues a sentence including a dishonorable discharge for a single use of cocaine is inappropriately severe. Because we conclude the military judge erred in not suppressing the urinalysis results, we do not reach Appellant’s second issue.
In the News—pending appellate cases.
Worth the Read.
“Eyewitness evidence, used in tens of thousands of criminal cases each year, crucially depends on eyewitness memory, which is quite fallible. The potential inaccuracy of eyewitness memory has been long demonstrated by examples of mis-identifications, including in cases of wrongful conviction. Eyewitness identification procedures, which are themselves experiments, lend themselves to scientific research as do few others in law. Today, decades of scientific research on visual perception and memory have identified key causes of error and methods for improving eyewitness performance. As a result, eyewitness evidence has become a testing ground for the use of science to inform the law. This Article examines how legal actors — state and federal courts, state lawmakers, and police agencies — have responded to this body of research. While U.S. Supreme Court rulings set a constitutional floor, we find that it largely does not inform eyewitness evidence law. State courts have increasingly incorporated eyewitness memory science, as we describe in a detailed fifty-state survey of rulings. Second, we explore how state lawmakers have done still more, in an analysis of twenty-four state statutes that regulate eyewitness identification procedure. Third, policing agencies have most eagerly embraced revised identification practices to take account of scientific research. We describe a sea change in police practice, including through model policy adopted in twenty-nine states. Based on these findings, we call into question top-down, stare-decisis-bound, and federal court-centric accounts that dominate constitutional criminal procedure.”
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